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SLOW DEATH OF A SALESMAN: THE WATERING DOWN
OF DILUTION VIABILITY BY DEMANDING PROOF OF
ACTUAL ECONOMIC LOSS
JEFFREY ENRIGHT*

That which does not kill us makes us stronger.
- FredricheNietzche
While may very well be true in life and on the battlefield that
that which does not kill us makes us stronger, it is not true for
trademarks. With the rise in popularity and importance of trademarks, the law has come full circle in protecting them. Whereas the
law was primarily concerned with protecting against diversion of
trade during trademark law's infancy, it moved toward a consumer
protection approach throughout the twentieth century, focusing on
consumer confusion.,
The passage of the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995 ("FTDA") 2 marked a renaissance in the law of
trademarks. Holders of very famous marks can enjoin another's use
of a similar mark absent any consumer confusion under the FTDA.
Aside from the general skirmishes over the worth of dilution
among commentators,3 a larger battle is currently being contested in
the courts. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have developed an exceedingly restrictive standard for proving an FTDA violation, requiring
4
that a plaintiff show actual consummated economic harm to its mark.
The Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, on the other hand, do not

*

J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2001.

1. See Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis
for Trademark Protection.,58 U. PITt. L. REV. 789, 796 (1997).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1998). The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, first enacted
January 16, 1996, amended section 43 of the Lanham Act to provide federal protection for
trademark dilution.
3. Compare Beverly W. Pattishall, Dawning Acceptance of the Dilution Rationale for
Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 289, 290 (1984), with Milton W.
Handler, Are the State Antidilution Laws Compatible with the National Protection of
Trademarks?,75 TRADEMARK REP. 269, 281 (1985).
4. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Transp.,
170 F.3d 449, 460-61 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 923 (1999); Westchester Media v.
PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 660 (5th Cir. 2000).
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require proof of economic harm.' The very fate of federal dilution
protection hangs in the balance, depending on which stance emerges
victorious in the end. Requiring proof of actual economic harm
under the FTDA demands an impossible degree of evidence, subjects
trademark owners to an uncompensable injury, contradicts the plain
meaning of the statute, and defeats the policy goals of the statute.
Truly famous marks must be given liberal protection against loss of
distinctiveness under the FTDA, and this can be done by focusing on
the similarity of the marks and the degree of renown of the senior
mark. Otherwise, federal dilution law, like the famous marks that it
seeks to protect, will suffer death by a thousand cuts, as the FTDA
slowly fades away into insignificance.
I.

BIRTH OF THE SALESMAN

Unlike patents and copyrights, which are considered property in
gross, 6 trademark law does not afford mark owners the same protections.' Trademark rights have historically been based on use.8 When
the use of a mark ends or fails to have the required impact on the
public, the mark's owner loses his rights. Historically, two primary
goals of trademark protection have often come in conflict with one
another. First, trademark law, by restricting unauthorized use by a
third party, attempts to protect the mark owner's investment in
reputation9 The other primary, and sometimes conflicting, goal of
trademark law is to protect the consumer from confusion in the
marketplace rather than focusing on protecting the owner."' Trade-

5. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands. Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224-25 (2nd Cir. 1999); Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2000); V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley,
259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001).
6. Patent in gross means that the patents and copyrights are owned outright by an entity
like conventional personal property regardless of whether that entity puts the patent or
copyright to use.
7. See Playboy Enters. Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 108081 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that "a trademark is not an omnibus property right or a monopoly
on the use of the words in the trademark"); see also New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g,
Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992) ("A trademark is a limited property right in a particular
word, phrase or symbol."): S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) ("Trademarks are not
monopolistic grants like patents and copyrights.").
8. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 414 (1916) (holding that
trademarks are "not the subject of property except in connection with an existing business").
9. See Klieger, supra note 1, at 796.
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (1998).
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mark legislation and judicial interpretation illustrate this clash of
ideals.II
Trademark law developed as a strain of unfair business competition law.'2 The focus of protection was on loss of sales and the law
sought to protect businesses from the predatory activity of competitors. Although the aim of this early focus was to prevent diversions of
sales by predatory practices, the focus of the inquiry changed to the
question of protecting consumers rather than preventing diversion of
sales. Therefore, the essential issue in any trademark infringement
inquiry became whether the defendant's mark would confuse
consumers into thinking that they were purchasing products from the
plaintiff. 3
This rational reflected early twentieth-century business practices.
Trademarks were primarily product identifiers for the particular
source of the good. 14 Consumers had personal relationships with
shopkeepers and relied on them to provide valuable information
regarding the choice and quality of a particular product." Shopkeepers assumed this role because consumer goods were made in relatively small quantities in the locale sold, and there was little chance
for consistency of quality among similar items.16
However, as the US economy grew during the twentieth century,
so did the function of trademarks. The role of trademarks grew to
include not only source identification, but also communication of
consistent quality from a particular source. 7 Trademarks became an
economically efficient way to market goods. Economic efficiency

11. See S. REP. NO. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946) (stating that trademark laws are
intended to "protect the public so that it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing
a particular trademark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and
which it wants to get" and to see that "where the owner of a trademark has spent energy, time
and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment from its
appropriation by pirates and cheats"); Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge
Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942) ("A trademark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a
purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a
mark exploits this human propensity by making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of
the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol.").
12. See Robert J. Shaughnessy, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First Amendment
Analysis, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 177, 180 (1987) ("[P]rotection of trademarks developed as part
of the common law of unfair competition.").
13. See Klieger, supra note 1, at 796.
14. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of Am., 54 U.S. 143, 146 (1920) (stating that trademarks
represent a "single thing coming from a single source").
15. See Klieger, supra note 1, at 799.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 796.
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theory contends that a trademark has value in and of itself stemming
from its ability to convey information to the consumer." Trademarks
can be valued by the savings in search costs made possible by allowing
the trademark to convey or embody the information or reputation of
the brand.' l As the role of the shopkeeper diminished, trademarks
began to serve as a shorthand method for providing consumers with
information they needed to choose a product. Hence, the utility of a
trademark to a consumer is lost if a consumer is confused as to the
source and other information-giving attributes of a trademark
because it is similar to a mark of a similar good. 0 If the law does not
prevent consumer confusion of a mark, not only is the utility of the
trademark destroyed, but businesses also lose the incentive to
develop valuable trademarks." Hence, the diversion of sales focus of
traditional trademark law developed into a means of protecting the
information-conferring capacity of a mark by seeking to prevent
22
consumer confusion.

During the last century, marketing of goods has undergone another dramatic transformation.23 As businesses attempted to expand
into new markets and product lines, they poured more resources into
trademark development and advertising to distinguish their products
from those of their competitors. 24 With the advent of radio and
television, consumers no longer had to go to the store to view a
18. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987) ("[A] trademark conveys information that allows
the consumer to say to himself, 'I need not investigate the attributes of the brand I am about to
purchase because the trademark is a shorthand way of telling me that the attributes are the
same as that of the brand I enjoyed earlier."').
19. Id.
20.

See J. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, at 2-7

(4th ed. 1999) ("[T]rademarks reduce the customer's cost of acquiring information about
products and services. Information, and the time required to acquire it, are not costless.").
21. See ANSELM KAMPERMAN SANDERS, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND ETHICS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ETHICS 227 (Lionel Bently & Spyros M. Maniatis eds., 1998)

("Market failure can be described as a situation in which creators are not rewarded for their
economic efforts because their achievements are not protected. This makes it economically
more attractive to copy than to create, resulting in creators producing fewer works than the
public would be willing to pay for.").
22. See Shaughnessy, supra note 12, at 180-81 ("Courts eventually dispensed with the
requirement that the owner show actual consumer confusion, and the test of trademark
infringement came to focus instead upon the likelihood of such confusion.").
23. Id. at 184 ("With the aid of modern advertising techniques, the trademark owner is able
to transform its mark into a symbolic expression of information about the character, price,
quality, and general desirability of its products, as well as its own reputation.").
24. See Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 274 ("Besides the possibility of creating
monopoly rents, trademarks may transform rents into costs, as one firm's expenditure on
promoting its mark cancels out that of another firm.").
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trademark; the trademark came to them. 25 Trademarks not only
conveyed origin and quality, but they sold the goods themselves.26
When consumers see the abstract symbol or word of the mark; they
make a mental association between the mark and the product, which
draws them to purchase it. Big businesses' use of trademarks in the
media has given rise to the American brand culture. 27 Now, "the
manufacturer's logo [is] an integral part of the product itself. ' ' 28
Consumers buy NIKE shoes as much to show off the swoosh symbol,
thus, proclaiming to all their allegiance to the sneaker giant, as they
29
do for other more traditional qualities, such as comfort and style.
As businesses spent their valuable resources in developing their
marks to build their reputations and forge a stronger mental association with the consumer, other businesses sought to free ride on a
powerful mark's reputation and publicity, regardless of whether they
were in direct competition.30 Trademark piracy developed, and the
courts were ill equipped to deal with its ramifications because the law
required, at a minimum, a likelihood of confusion.31 This parasitic
behavior diminished the desirable social and economic functions of
trademarks. Famous and distinctive trademarks indicate "a particular
standard of quality, distinguish competing goods, symbolize good will,
operate as advertising tools, enhance fair competition, motivate
consumers to purchase, insure that consumers get the products they
want, and facilitate the establishment of a standard of acceptable
business conduct."32 When a single trademark represents more than
one origin, its economic viability to its owner is damaged, and its
information-conferring capacity to the consumer is harmed.

25. Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 960, 973 (1993) (writing that
trademarks are "injected into the stream of communication with the pressure of a firehose by
means of mass media campaigns").
26. Id. at 961 ("There's a growing tendency to use trademarks not just to identify products,
but also to enhance or adorn them, even to create new commodities altogether.").
27. See generally Ellen P. Winner, Right of Identity: Right of Publicity and Protectionfor a
Trademark's "Persona",71 TRADEMARK REP. 193 (1981).
28. See Kozinski, supra note 25, at 961.
29. See id. at 962 ("Where trademarks once served only to tell the consumer who made the
product, they now often enhance it or become a functional part of it.").
30. See Frank I. Schecter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection,40 HARV. L. REV.
813, 825 (1927).
31. See id.
32. The United States Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission Report and
Recommendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 387
(1987) [hereinafter Commission Report].

CHICA GO-KENT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77:937

In 1927, Professor Frank Schecter defined these problems as
"dilution" of the senior mark.33 In his article, Schecter argued that
trademark piracy did not always cause consumer confusion, but
caused irreparable harm to the senior user nonetheless. 34 Schecter
identified this harm as "the gradual whittling away or dispersion of
the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its
use upon non-competing goods."35 He indicated that dilution causes
the senior mark to lose its economic worth because it is no longer
distinctive.36 Schecter argued that "[t]he more distinctive or unique
the mark, the deeper is its impress upon the public consciousness, and
the greater its need for protection against vitiation or dissociation
from the particular product in connection with which it has been
used. '37 As such, he concluded that arbitrary, coined, and fanciful
marks should be given higher protection than other distinctive
marks.3
Schecter's article was met with resistance, and the courts attempted to deal with the problems Schecter discussed by eliminating
the requirement of competition between the opposing marks. 39
However, the test continued to focus on whether the consumer would
be confused as to the origins of the dissimilar goods. Schecter himself
proposed a dilution statute to Congress, but his proposal was
unsuccessful.40 Although the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946
enhanced federal protection and uniformity for trademark doctrine, it
did not include any protections against dilution, instead basing
liability on a likelihood of consumer confusion theory. 4'
However, dilution remedies were successfully developed at the
state level, and in 1947 Massachusetts adopted the first state antidilution statute.4 2 In 1964, the United States Trademark Association
("USTA") published the Model State Trademark Bill, which
followed Massachusetts's language and became the exemplar for
33. Schecter, supra note 30, at 832.
34. Id. at 825.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 828.
39. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. b (1995).
40. See H.R. 11592, 72d Cong. § 2(d)(3) (1932).
41. The Lanham Act protects against any "use in commerce [of a mark] ... likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1994).
42. See Act of May 2, 1947, ch. 307 § 7(a), 1947 Mass. Acts 300 (codified as amended at
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. l10B § 12 (West 1996)).
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future state statutes.4 3 Until 1977, state courts were reluctant to find
that a noncompeting user of a similar mark diluted an established
mark; however, they were willing to recognize that such protection
did exist." Courts were reluctant to eliminate consumer confusion
analysis and to grant relief solely based on dilution because they were
45
wary of granting trademark owners property rights in gross.
Beginning in 1977, the dilution doctrine gained strength as illustrated in the New York Court of Appeals decision, Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc.46 In this case, Allied
Maintenance Corporation, a cleaning and maintenance business, sued
Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., a heating and ventilating business,
under the New York Anti-dilution statute.4 7 The court held that
"Allied" was not an 4 inherently strong mark, nor had it acquired
"secondary meaning" which would make it susceptible to dilution. 49
However, the court encouraged courts to apply dilution doctrine and
held that
[n]otwithstanding the absence of judicial enthusiasm for the antidilution statutes, we believe that section 368-d does extend the protection afforded trade-marks and trade names beyond that
provided by actions for infringement and unfair competition. The
evil which the Legislature sought to remedy was not public confusion caused by similar products or services sold by competitors, but
a cancer-like growth of dissimilar products or services which feeds
upon the business reputation of an established distinctive trademark or name .... 10
This was a veritable shot across the bow to other courts and scholars
that dilution protection was here to stay as a viable means of protection for distinctive trademarks.
43. Reprinted in MCCARTHY, supra note 20, at 22-15.
44. See Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural" Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal
Dilution Statute Necessary?. 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 433, 441 (1994) (indicating that of the 159
state law dilution claims heard by federal circuit courts between 1977 and 1995. only 4 resulted
in final injunctions based exclusively on dilution).
45. See generally id.
46. 369 N.E.2d 1162 (N.Y. 1977).
47. Id. at 1163.
48. While arbitrary, fanciful and suggestive marks are given full protection, "secondary
meaning" is required before a descriptive mark can obtain protection. See, e.g., Int'l Kennel
Club of Chi., Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1085 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that
secondary meaning exists "only if most consumers have come to think of the word not as
descriptive at all but as the name of the product" and that factors to consider when looking for
secondary meaning "include the amount and manner of advertising, volume of sales, the length
and manner of use, direct consumer testimony, and consumer surveys").
49. Allied, 369 N.E.2d at 1166.
50. Id. at 1165.
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Since 1977, courts have given growing support for applying dilution doctrine, and the number of courts granting injunctive relief,
solely based on dilution doctrine, has greatly increased."' In 1987, the
Supreme Court applied dilution rationale in San Francisco Arts &
Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee.5 In this case, the

Court held that the USOC had exclusive commercial rights to use the
word "Olympic" regardless of whether use by a third party would
3
cause confusion.5
Throughout the evolution of dilution theory, two distinct forms
of dilution have developed. One form, dilution by blurring, results
when there is a "dispersion of consumer's association of a particular
trademark with a particular product or service. ' 5 4 For example,
McDonalds' current slogan, "We love to see you smile," could be
diluted by a financial services corporation with the same slogan. In
this example, it is highly unlikely that consumers would be confused
as to the origin of the products, but given McDonald's fame and
association with the slogan, it is likely that a consumer would
recognize that the same slogan represented two separate entities.
The second form, dilution by tarnishment, involves an element of
negative connection between the senior mark and some perceived
evil. Here, use of the junior mark "tarnishes" the senior mark in
some negative way. 5 Associating the senior mark with illicit drugs or
pornography are the most typical instances of dilution by
tarnishment.56 One example is a case where the defendant made tshirts with the slogan "ENJOY COCAINE" that imitated the color
and script of Coca-Cola.57 Such unsavory associations are injurious to
a famous mark's good will and reputation and can cause a loss of
consumer loyalty and trade.5"
By 1987, twenty-three states had adopted the Model State
Trademark Bill for Dilution and the time seemed ripe for a federal

51. See Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 736 F.2d 1153, 1159 (7th Cir. 1984); Inst. Co. v.
Marine Corps League, 509 F. Supp. 323, 340 (N.D. I11.
1981).
52. See 483 U.S. 522, 539 (1987) ("[Ulnauthorized uses, even if not confusing, nevertheless
may harm the [senior user] by lessening the distinctiveness ... of the mark.").
53. Id.
54. Klieger, supra note 1, at 823 (citing Nat'l City Bank of Cleveland v. Nat'l City Window
Cleaning Co., 190 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ohio 1963)).
55. Id. at 828.
56. Id.
57. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (E.D.N.Y.1972).
58. See Klieger, supra note 1,at 828.
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statute. 59 In that same year, the USTA submitted a report to
Congress suggesting several proposed changes to the Lanham Act,
including provisions for both conventional dilution by blurring, as
well as dilution by tarnishment.61 The USTA proposed that a narrow
category of "famous" trademarks should be given nationwide federal
protection from dilution.61 The USTA further indicated that famous
trademarks were powerful marketing tools that generated consumer
loyalty and goodwill. 62 As such, the USTA argued that "[f]amous
marks are most likely to be harmed by reduced distinctiveness. They
are enormously valuable but fragile assets, susceptible to irreversible
injury from promiscuous use. '63 Despite the USTA's reasoned
argument, the dilution provision of the bill was omitted during a
House-Senate compromise, possibly because of First Amendment
concerns. 64
In 1989, Judge Sweet of the Second Circuit formulated a highly
criticized, yet heavily utilized test to analyze a state dilution claim in
Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.65 In his
concurring opinion, Judge Sweet articulated six factors for determining whether a likelihood of dilution exists: (1) similarity between the
marks; (2) similarity of the products; (3) sophistication of the
consumers; (4) presence of predatory intent; (5) renown of the senior
mark; and (6) renown of the junior mark.66 Finally, in 1995, Congress
passed the FTDA, which added dilution protection to the Lanham
Act.67 At first glance, the statute vastly widened a trademark owner's
rights, providing that
[t]he owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable,
to an injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark
has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of

59. Commission Report, supra note 32, at 454.
60. See generally U.S.T.A., The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, New York, 1989.
61. Commission Report, supra note 32, at 456 ("We propose adding a narrowly drawn
dilution section to the Lanham Act, protecting only registered marks which become famous
throughout a substantial part of the United States.").
62. Id. at 455.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 372.
65. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d
Cir. 1989) (Sweet, J., concurring).
66. Id.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1998).
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the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection. 68
The Lanham Act defines dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of
a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of competition between the owner of
the famous mark and other parties or the likelihood of confusion,
' '69
mistake, or deception.
Addressing the remedies afforded to a plaintiff of a diluted mark,
the statute requires that
[i]n an action brought under this subsection, the owner of the famous mark shall be entitled only to injunctive relief as set forth in
section 1116 of this title unless the person against whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade70 on the owner's reputation
or to cause dilution of the famous mark.
Judicial interpretation of the FTDA has been inconsistent. The
Fourth Circuit was the first federal appeals court to declare its
understanding of the FTDA's standard of proof.7 In Ringling Bros.Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel
Development, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant's slogan "The
Greatest Snow on Earth" diluted its famous slogan, "The Greatest
Show on Earth."72 The plaintiff argued that a senior mark is diluted
when a junior mark is identical or "sufficiently similar to the famous
mark" and that individuals would make a mental association between
the two.73 The plaintiff then argued that although not identical, the
two slogans were similar enough that the court could find the
requisite mental association as a matter of law absent any further
evidence.74 Relying on this argument, the plaintiff offered no proof of
actual consummated economic harm.75 The Fourth Circuit chose a
stringent requirement in its interpretation of the statute, holding that
the plaintiff must offer proof that the junior use caused "actual harm
76
to the senior marks' economic value.

68. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (1998).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1998).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (1998).
71. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
72. Id. at 451.
73. Id. at 452.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 462.
76. Id. at 453.
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By setting such a high standard, the Fourth Circuit made raising
a dilution claim in federal court a thorny endeavor. The court
admitted that the FTDA's guidance "surely does not leap fully and
immediately from the statutory text."" The court also admitted that
"[t]he real interpretive problem has been with how harm to the senior
mark's selling power ... could be proved."7 8 The court also conceded
that its requirement of a showing of actual lessening of the senior
mark's selling power is a "stringent interpretation of 'dilution' under
the federal Act" but concluded that its decision was still justified. 79
The court explained that conclusive judicial presumptions of actual harm cannot be made because "the probabilities are not high
enough nor means of proof sufficiently lacking to allow such a
presumption.""" The court noted that it is not "improbable that some
junior uses will have no effect ... upon a senior mark's economic
value."'" The court also noted that there are independent ways of
proving harm,82 but that the "plain meaning" of the FTDA required a
finding of actual harm since the language of the statute required that
a violating mark "causes dilution" as opposed to causing a likelihood
of dilution.,3 The court also held that the "lessening of the capacity of
a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services" language
of the FTDA mandated that "the end harm at which [the FTDA] is
84
aimed is a mark's selling power, not its 'distinctiveness' as such."
After Ringling Bros., the Second Circuit cast its line into the federal dilution quandary in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc. and
Pepperidge Farm, Inc.85 In this case, Nabisco appealed from a
preliminary injunction barring it from selling "orange, bite-sized,
cheddar cheese flavored, goldfish-shaped cracker[s]." 86 The district
court held that Nabisco's crackers diluted Pepperidge Farm's goldfish
crackers, which had been used in commerce continuously since 1962.87
On appeal, Nabisco claimed that the court should apply the same
standard of proof as the Fourth Circuit. Nabisco argued, in part, that
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id. at 457.
Id. at 458-59.
Id. at 459-60.
Id. at 460.
Id. ("[I1f they do exist, there are means of proving them.").
Id. at 461.
Id. at 458.
191 F.3d 208 (2nd Cir. 1999).
Id. at 212.
Id.
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"dilution cannot be found without documentation of actual injury,
consisting of an actual reduction in the senior mark's selling power." 88
The court disagreed and applied a nonexhaustive list of factors to
determine if the junior use "caused dilution" by creating a likelihood
of harm to the senior user. 89
The court held that "[a] very distinctive mark is thus more likely
to suffer dilution of distinctiveness than is a less distinctive mark." 9
The court also held that the "marks must be of sufficient similarity so
that.., the junior mark will conjure an association with the senior."' 9
Although not required by the FTDA, the court included "actual
confusion" as a considerable factor because "[w]hen consumers
confuse the junior mark with the senior, blurring has occurred." 92
The court opined that the Fourth Circuit's requirement of actual
harm was "inappropriate" because it would often be impossible for a
senior user to show actual loss of revenue. 93 The Second Circuit
argued that there was "no reason why the senior users could not rely
on persuasive circumstantial evidence of dilution of the distinctiveness of their marks without being obligated to show lost revenue or
engage in an expensive battle of surveys." 94 Furthermore, the court
held that the Fourth Circuit's reading 95"depends on excessive literalism to defeat the intent of the statute.
The Fifth Circuit then leaped into the fray in Westchester Media
v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc.96 In this case, PRL claimed that Westchester's use of the title "Polo" for its equestrian magazine diluted
PRL's established Ralph Lauren "Polo" trademark on various
goods. 97 Again, the argument focused on whether proof of dilution
required "a showing of actual or merely threatened economic
harm." 98 The Fifth Circuit followed the Fourth Circuit's lead and
chose to require a showing of actual consummated economic harm
before a plaintiff could obtain equitable relief. 9
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 214.
See id. at 217.
Id.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 224.
Id.
214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 663.
Id. at 670.
Id.
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In finding in favor of the defendant, the Fifth Circuit relied
heavily on the rationale of the Fourth Circuit. " , The court arrived at
this finding by noting that the action prohibited under the Act is
"another person's... [actual] use... not merely threatened use of
The court also stated that the Act provides
the mark."""
2
compensatory relief and restitution when willful conduct is shown.'
Lastly, the court acknowledged that the plain meaning of the statute
0
mandated an actual harm standard.

3

The Seventh Circuit was the next federal appeals court to remedy this malady in the statute. In Eli Lilly & Co. v. NaturalAnswers,
Inc.,"" the pharmaceutical giant Eli Lilly & Co. claimed that the
defendant's mark, "HERBROZAC," diluted its famous mark
"PROZACthorn. '"' 5 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
grant of preliminary injunction, which barred the defendant's mark
from further use based on dilution and infringement. °6 In so doing,
the Seventh Circuit reasoned that a plaintiff was not required to show
proof of actual consummated economic harm before obtaining relief
under the FTDA. 17 The court based this decision on the notion that
an actual harm standard "holds plaintiffs to an impossible level of
proof."'

8

Given the difficulty of proving a connection between

dilution and revenue loss, the court held that "[i]t is hard to believe
that Congress would create a right of action but at the same time
render proof of the plaintiff's case all but impossible.' 9
The Sixth Circuit was the latest federal appeals court to address
this issue and consequently provided support for dilution in V Secret
Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley."" The court only briefly discussed the
issue addressed in this Note, but sided with the Second and Seventh
Circuits in refusing to require proof of actual economic harm before
relief could be granted.," The court focused on a single sentence of
100. Id. at 670-71.
101. Id. at 671.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000).
105. Id. at 459.
106. Id. at 469.
107. Id. at 468 (holding that proof of "likelihood of dilution" will meet the requirements of
the "causes dilution" prong).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001).
111. Id. at 475 ("Despite the Fourth Circuit's somewhat persuasive arguments, we conclude
that the Nabisco test both tracks the language of the statute and follows more closely Congress's
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the legislative history of the FTDA, which stated that "[c]onfusion
leads to immediate injury, while dilution is an infection, which if
allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the
mark."'12 The court held that there were two reasons that the
sentence precluded the requirement of actual economic harm. First,
it "evinces an intent to provide a broad remedy for the lesser
trademark violation of dilution and recognizes that the essence of the
dilution claim is a property right in the 'potency' of a mark,", 3 and
second, it "evinces an intent to allow a remedy before dilution has
actually caused economic harm to the senior mark."114
II. ANALYSIS
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits' requirement of a showing of actual economic harm does a disservice to Congress' intent in passing
the FTDA because it holds plaintiffs to an impossible level of proof,
subjects senior mark holders to uncompensable injury, contravenes
the plain meaning of the statute, and eviscerates a law meant to
protect against the loss of distinctiveness, not revenue.
A.

Impossibility of Proof

Under the Fourth and Fifth Circuits' rationale, a senior mark
holder must show proof of actual consummated economic harm
despite the possible presence of unrelated mitigating factors. Such
mitigating factors can include increases in advertising, beneficial
changes in consumer motives, and market fluctuations. In instances
where a mark is becoming famous across the country, uniqueness of
the mark could be diluted even as sales are increasing." 5 Even if a
senior mark holder could show loss of revenue, it would be exceedingly difficult to produce evidence that the loss resulted from dilution
6
and not some other factor.'

intent in enacting the FTDA.").
112. H.R. REP. No. 104-374 (1995), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1032.
113. V Secret, 259 F.3d at 475.
114. Id. at 476.
115. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[I1t is
possible that the distinctiveness of its [famous] mark could be diluted even as its sales are
increasing, albeit not increasing as much as they would in the absence of the offending mark.").
116. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc. and Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2nd
Cir. 1999) ("Even if diminished revenue could be shown, it would be extraordinarily speculative
and difficult to prove that the loss was due to the dilution of the mark.").
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The Fourth Circuit claims that if proof of actual consummated
economic harm is not required, trademark owners will obtain
property rights in gross in their marks based upon a conclusive
judicial presumption that unauthorized third party use of a similar
mark has caused harm.' 7 This perception runs counter to existing
trademark law. A leading treatise on trademark law states that for
infringement actions, "it is not necessary for [p]laintiff to prove actual
damage or injury to obtain injunctive relief" and that "[o]ne does not
have to await consummation of the threatened injury to obtain
preventative relief."", Such evidentiary decisions have not created
property rights in gross thus far for trademarks, and extending this
rationale for dilution claims will not have this effect either. Indeed,
courts readily assume the presence of confusion in infringement
actions and thus grant equitable relief prior to a showing of actual
harm." 9
The requirement of a showing of "irreparable injury" prevents
any of the abuses feared by the Fourth and Fifth Circuit. McCarthy
states that
[t]he 'irreparable injury' requirement is merely a specific application of the general doctrine that equitable relief cannot be granted
unless Plaintiff shows that the remedy at law is inadequate.... Irreparable harm exists only where there is a threatened

imminent loss that will be very difficult to quantify." 20
As previously indicated, proof of lost revenue because of dilution is
very difficult to prove. Therefore, where the senior mark holder
makes a strong showing of likelihood of economic harm, "irreparable
injury" should be accepted as a matter of course.
The legislative history of the FTDA lends support to this claim,
stating that "[t]he use of DUPONT shoes, BUICK aspirin, and
2
KODAK pianos would be actionable under this legislation.' '

117. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
118. See MCCARTHY, supra note 20, at 30-21.
119. See Hulburt Oil & Grease Co. v. Hulburt Oil & Grease Co., 371 F.2d 251, 256 (7th Cir.
1966) ("The appropriation of the plaintiff's name by the incorporation of the defendant under
the circumstances [is] likely to cause confusion .. "); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Fund of Funds,
Inc., 274 F. Supp. 517, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ("It is not necessary to show actual cases of
deception or confusion, since the test is the likelihood that an appreciable number of ordinarily
prudent purchasers will be confused."); Magic Pan, Inc. v. Magic Pan, Inc., 192 U.S.P.Q. 321,
321 (S.D. Ind. 1976) ("[C]onfusion would naturally and probably result from the defendants' use
of the name.").
120. MCCARTHY, supra note 20, at 30-46.
121. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995).

CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:937

Nowhere in the congressional reports does it state that these famous
marks would be protected only after a showing of actual consummated economic harm. The House Report, therefore, demonstrates
that dilution can be presumed in the preceding examples absent any
showing of proof of actual economic harm by the senior user. The
Fourth Circuit refused to address the fact that this House Report
conflicts with its requirement of proof of actual economic loss, other
than to say that "it speaks directly only to the effect of an identical
'
replication which is not involved in this case."122
This sidestepping by
the Fourth Circuit illustrates the flaws of its, and the Fifth Circuit's,
logic and is an attempt to create a different standard of proof for
identical marks. Nowhere does the FTDA require that a junior mark
be identical to the senior mark, and common sense dictates that the
statute would have included this prerequisite if Congress intended to
limit protection to only identical use. A more sound reason for the
House Report's use of identical marks was to provide clear examples
of dilution of universally acknowledged famous marks without having
to delve into the degree of similarity between the marks and examinations of other factors. Therefore, the legislative intent should lead to
judicial acknowledgment of equitable relief absent proof of actual
consummated economic harm.
B.

Uncompensable Injury

Requiring proof of actual consummated economic harm before
injunctive relief can be obtained under the FTDA will subject the
senior user to an uncompensable injury in almost all instances.123 A
senior user will be helpless until the junior user melts the distinctiveness of the senior mark to such a substantial degree that the senior
user can show actual consummated economic harm. Since the senior
mark holder is limited to injunctive relief absent a showing of
willfulness, a plaintiff will be barred from bringing suit "prior to
suffering an injury for which the Act will not compensate them in
many circumstances.' ' 24 Furthermore, when a plaintiff has finally
122. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 459 n.5.
123. See Nabisco. Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc. and Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2nd
Cir. 1999) ("To read the statute as suggested by the Ringling opinion would subject the senior
user to uncompensable injury."); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468 (7th
Cir. 2000) (holding that if a plaintiff could not bring a claim "prior to economic injury, upstart
companies would be unable to seek a declaratory judgment that their mark is sufficiently
different").
124. Eli Lilly, 233 F.3d at 467 (citing Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224).

2002]

SLOW DEATH OFA SALESMAN

suffered enough damage to bring suit, the damage caused by the
defendant's mark could provide the defendant with the argument that
the plaintiff's mark was not sufficiently distinctive." 5 In essence, the
fruits of the defendant's diluting conduct would provide a defense for
126
that very conduct.
Essentially, requiring proof of actual harm causes irreparable
harm to the senior mark holder. One of the basic principles of tort
remedy is to put the wounded party in the position it was in prior to
the harm suffered. 27 This is impossible under the Fourth and Fifth
Circuit's rationale. The Fourth Circuit implies that a senior mark
holder will not suffer uncompensable harm because the FTDA offers
damages only if the plaintiff proves that the defendant's use is willful
and causes economic harm by lessening the future capacity of the
mark to sell goods. 28 Absent a whistleblower or a smoking-gun office
memo outlining the intricacies of a plan to dilute another's mark,
proof of willful dilution, and thus the possibility of obtaining damages
under the Act, will never happen.
Aside from the logical flaws of this proof requirement and definition of "capacity," the Fourth Circuit also fails to identify the
irreparable harm a famous mark suffers when used by more than one
party. When third parties use the same, or a sufficiently similar mark
as the senior user's famous mark, that mark loses distinctiveness by
indicating to consumers more than one origin. This destroys the
senior user's investment in the distinctiveness of the mark and
nullifies the motive to put forth further effort to create strong marks.
While trademark law has never been as concerned with influencing
creativity as have other areas of intellectual property law, the law
does require distinctiveness in order to maximize the information
conferred to the public. The Third Circuit identified this factor when
holding that "a lack of control over the use of one's own mark
' 29
amounts to irreparable harm.'

125. See id.
126. See Commission Report, supra note 32, at 461 ("Third party uses of the same or similar
marks are relevant in determining the fame and distinctiveness of the mark, since the mark must
be in substantially exclusive use. If a mark is in widespread use, it may not be famous for the
goods or services of one business.").
127. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1 (5th ed. 1984).
128. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 461 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that the statute provides for compensatory relief
and restitution where willful conduct is shown.).
129. Times Mirror Magazines v. Las Vegas Sports News, 212 F.3d 157. 169 (3d Cir. 2000).
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The degree of proof that the Fourth and Fifth Circuits require is
unjust. Since the FTDA does not provide damages (absent the
almost impossible showing of willfulness), the irreparable injury that
the senior user has already suffered can never be remedied. Arguably, injunctive relief at this post-mortem stage is futile because the
diluting mark might already have pillaged the selling power of the

senior mark. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits' reasoning is analogous to
granting a victim a restraining order against her assailant only after he
has murdered her. Therefore, based solely on the fact that injunctive
relief is usually the only type of relief that will be obtainable under
the FTDA, and the fact that such relief contradicts the Fourth and

Fifth Circuits' actual economic harm standard, the plain meaning of
the statute mandates that a senior user need not offer proof of actual
consummated economic harm.
C.

Plain Meaning

The Fourth and Fifth Circuits hold that the plain meaning rule
mandates a showing of actual consummated economic harm; 3 "
however, faithful adherence to the plain meaning rule precludes such
a requirement. In a case the Fourth Circuit itself cites, the Supreme
Court urges, "if the words convey a definite meaning, which involves

no absurdity, nor any contradiction of any other parts of the instrument, then that meaning, apparent on the face of the instrument,
must be accepted ... "131 The Supreme Court also requires that a
court not read a word or sentence in isolation from the rest of the
statute.'3 2 The Fourth and Fifth Circuits' holdings that a plaintiff is
required to show actual consummated economic harm based on the
statutory terminology, "causes dilution," and "the lessening of the

130. Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 671 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[I]n
the absence of any authority stating that Congress intended a 'likelihood of dilution' standard
for the FTDA, we may not depart from the plain meaning of the statute."); Ringling Bros., 170
F.3d at 461 (agreeing that the proof of actual economic harm is indicated by the plain meaning
of the statute).
131. Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662.670 (1889).
132. See United States Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439,
455 (1993) (noting that "[s]tatutory construction is a 'holistic endeavor,' and, at a minimum,
must account for a statute's full text .... I); see also Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11
(1962) (noting that "[a] section of a statute should not be read in isolation from the context of
the whole Act, and that in fulfilling our responsibility in interpreting legislation, 'we must not be
guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but [should] look to provisions of the
whole law, and to its object and policy[]"').
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capacity," violates the plain meaning rule because of the relief that
the FTDA grants.
Absent a showing of willful dilution, the owner of a senior mark
"shall be entitled only to injunctive relief.' 1 33 Since the whole theory
behind the FTDA is to prevent the gradual watering down of a
mark's distinctiveness, it would be pointless for the Act's sole remedy,
injunctive relief, to be granted after a senior user has shown proof of
economic harm. Such a rationale ignores basic principles of injunctive relief. The Supreme Court's explanation of the purpose of
injunctive relief has never wavered: courts grant injunctive relief to
prevent future harmful conduct. '1 4 Injunctions are not focused on
past wrongs and need not be based on actual economic harm already
suffered.'35 Therefore, the "plain meaning" of the injunctive relief
offered under the FTDA indicates that it is focused on preventing
future harm.
Furthermore, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits' interpretation of the
statutory language "causes dilution" as "actual, consummated
dilution"' 3 6 requiring proof of economic harm is not necessarily
correct. Black's Law Dictionary defines "cause" as "[t]o be the cause
or occasion of; to effect as an agent; to bring about; to bring in
existence; to make to induce; to compel."'' 3 A "cause" is, therefore,
an agent that brings about or is associated with a result. 3 8 Read in
conjunction with the congressional intent and the early point at which
dilution of a mark begins, it is illogical not to find an alternative
interpretation of "causes dilution." Congress stated that the intent of
the Lanham Act was "to protect persons engaged in such commerce
against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and deception in such
commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or
colorable imitations.' ' 39 This language indicates that Congress' intent
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (1998).
134. See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 61 (1975) ("Injunctive relief is
historically designed to deter ....);see also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)
(concluding that injunctive relief looks to the future rather than the past); United States. v. W.T.
Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953) (noting that the purpose of injunction is to prevent future
violations and does not require a showing of past wrongs); United States v. Or. State Med.
Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952) (supporting the idea that actions for injunction are forward
looking).
135. Id.
136. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev.,
170 F.3d 449, 458 (4th Cir. 1999); Westchester, 214 F.3d at 671.
137. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 221 (6th ed. 1990).
138. Id.
139. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1998).
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was to create a forward-looking remedy. In the preceding analogy
concerning the murdered woman, the avoidance of harmful contact
obtained by the restraining order is defeated by the grave harm
already experienced. Likewise, the Act's intent to protect the mark
holder and prevent harm is defeated if uncompensable economic
harm has already accrued. Hence, in order to follow the intent of the
statute, "causes dilution" must be read as the current immeasurable
whittling away of the distinctiveness of a mark that will cause
incalculable economic harm in the future. The forward-looking
statutory language, the early point at which dilution of a mark begins,
and the injunctive relief offered under the FTDA, all indicate that the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits are incorrect in holding that the plain
meaning of "causes dilution" requires a senior mark holder to show
consummated economic harm before relief is available.
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits also claim that the plain meaning
of the word "capacity" in the FTDA's definition of "dilution" does
not imply future capacity as one would naturally think, but rather
"former capacity."' 4 This runs counter to the word's most common
definition, which has a completely future-looking focus.41 The Fourth
Circuit claims that contextual indicators such as the aforementioned
"causes dilution" language and the fact that the statute grants
damages "where willful conduct is shown" requires a backward2 In addition to the previously
looking interpretation of "capacity. ' 14
discussed analysis for "causes dilution" as a contextual indicator,
common sense dictates that "capacity" as used in the F1DA should
not be viewed as "former ability."
The Supreme Court provides significant guidance for statutory
interpretation in holding that where Congress "use[s] general
language and thereby requires the judiciary to apply this general
language to a specific problem... [courts] must resort to whatever
aids to interpretation the legislation in its entirety and its history
provide."143

The legislative history of the FTDA is devoid of any deliberations as to how Congress defined "capacity." However, "capacity" is
a term of common English usage and The American Heritage Dic-

tionary defines "capacity" as "[t]he ability to receive, hold, or ab140.
141.
142.
143.

See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 461; Westchester, 214 F.3d at 671.
Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 461; Westchester, 214 F.3d at 671.
Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 461.
Offcut Hous. Co. v. Sarpy County, 351 U.S. 253, 260 (1956).
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sorb.' 144 Nothing in this definition alludes to a prior ability as the
Fourth Circuit suggests. Based on its common use in the English
language, "capacity" is forward looking and implies a preventive
intent of the statute. Therefore, because the Act's congressional
intent is focused on preventing damage, because "causes dilution" is a
contextual indicator of support for the Second and Seventh Circuits'
readings of the statute, and because everyday usage of the term "capacity" is forward-looking, the plain meaning rule demands that a
showing of likelihood of economic harm will be actionable.
The Fourth Circuit also refers to the FTDA's monetary damages
provision as further support for its definition of "capacity."'"
However, this logic is flawed because it renders useless the relief
granted by the Act. The Supreme Court warns against such results,
holding that it is "hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that
same law."' 46 In its claim that a senior user will be entitled to
monetary damages in many instances, the Fourth Circuit presupposes
that a junior user will have the requisite predatory intent and
therefore purposefully choose a mark identical or strikingly similar to
that of the senior user.
In essence, the Fourth Circuit is taking a giant step backward in
trademark theory by alluding to this "misappropriation" basis for
monetary relief. Stated briefly, "misappropriation" involves unfair
competition beyond the conventional framework of "passing off" by
creating a common-law property right against "misappropriation" of
commercial worth.1 47 Academia has not viewed misappropriation
kindly, and the theory has not been used as the basis for relief since
the International News Service case.

48

By presupposing parasitic

motive and activity as one of its bases of support for requiring proof
of actual economic harm, the Fourth Circuit alludes to common-law
property rights in gross for trademarks, which is exactly what the
Fourth Circuit claims to be avoiding with its holding.149
144. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 283 (3d ed. 1992).
145. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 461 ("Unlike the state antidilution statutes which provide
only injunctive relief, reflecting their sole focus on prevention of future harm, the federal Act
provides... both compensatory and restitutionary relief .....
146. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 62 (1998).
147. See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 217 (1918).
148. See generally Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of
International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411 (1983).
149. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 459 ("It will not bear a property-right-in-gross
interpretation.").
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The Fourth Circuit's rationale not only ignores the language of
the statute but also the operations of the marketplace. Often,
dilution could arise when a junior user is not in competition with the
senior user, and, therefore, has no purposeful intent to engage in
trademark piracy yet still uses a mark that dilutes the senior mark
because of lack of awareness. Because monetary damages could not
be granted in such cases under the FTDA, the senior user would
suffer uncompensable harm and would be able to enjoin the diluter
only from further damaging actions. Therefore, based on a "[m]ore
natural reading of the intent of the statute's text, which would give
effect to all of its provisions,"',, the plain meaning of "capacity" must
be forward-looking.' Hence, for all of the aforementioned reasons,
the plain meaning rule mandates that a plaintiff does not need to
show proof of actual consummated economic harm.
D. Loss of Distinctivenessand Not Revenue
The FTDA contains no express indication that the harm sought
to be prevented is the senior mark's economic value. Schecter
defined the legal harm that dilution law seeks to prevent as the loss of
a mark's "uniqueness."' 5 2 The Fourth Circuit viewed the legal harm
sought to be protected as the economic value of a mark's selling
power.'53 However, the FTDA states that relief is warranted if the
junior mark "causes dilution of the distinctive quality" of the senior
mark.5 4 "Distinctive quality" of a mark is more analogous to
uniqueness than it is to economic value. Therefore, it seems incorrect
for the Fourth and Fifth Circuits to require proof of actual consummated economic harm when economic harm may not be the legal
harm for which prevention is sought in the first place.
Furthermore, Schecter defined dilution of a unique mark as "the
gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity."' 55 Dilution,
therefore, begins the instant that an individual makes the cognitive
150. United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc. 517 U.S.
544, 551 (1996).
151. See also Denn v. Reid, 35 U.S. 524, 527 (1836) ("Where the language of an act is not
clear and is of doubtful construction; a court may well look at every part of the statute: at its
title, and the mischief intended to be remedied in carrying it into effect.").
152. Schecter, supra note 30, at 830.
153. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 456 (stating that the antidilution statutes were targeted at
protecting the economic value of the marks).
154. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (1998).
155. Schecter. supra note 30, at 825.
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decision that a single mark is representative of two unrelated sources.
This canon of trademark law is not to be confused with the cognitively distinct doctrine of consumer confusion. In the confusion
analysis, the consumer is confused as to origin. In the dilution
analysis, instead of the consumer being puzzled as to the origin of the
marks, the consumer identifies a single mark with separate origins.
Hence, if a judge, viewing the marks from the average consumer's
perspective, subjectively determines that a junior mark is so similar to
a famous mark that he identifies the marks as essentially one in the
same, dilution in fact has already occurred. The junior mark has
already whittled away the uniqueness of the senior mark in the
judge's mind. Contrary to an argument of "bootstrapping," this
analysis shows that, given the forward-looking language of Congress'
intent, the early point at which dilution of a mark begins, and the
injunctive relief offered under the FTDA, it is unpersuasive for a
court to hold that the FTDA requires a senior mark holder to show
consummated economic harm before relief is available.
III. RECOMMENDED FACTORS FOR COURTS TO CONSIDER

If a plaintiff is not required to show proof of actual consummated
economic harm, what standard should a court use to determine if a
junior user causes dilution of a senior mark? Given the "mischief"
Congress sought to prevent, and the dearth of legislative deliberations
in favor of an actual economic harm requirement, the court should
not create a practically insurmountable barrier for the plaintiff.
Therefore, following the rationale of the Seventh Circuit, the test for
dilution should be the degree of similarity between the marks and the
56
renown of the senior mark.
Requiring significant similarity between marks will protect
against barriers to free competition.'57 Obviously, the degree of
similarity between the marks factors into whether the marks will be
viewed as essentially one in the same. As previously stated, dilution
by blurring only occurs when a consumer identifies a single symbol as
identifying two separate sources. Therefore, in order to ensure that
the FTDA does not overtake traditional consumer confusion analysis,
the marks should have a sufficient similarity so that a judicially
156. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 469 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[Wle
will consider.., the similarity. .. and the renown ... ").
157. See Times Mirror Magazines v. Las Vegas Sports News, 212 F.3d 157, 170 (3d Cir. 2000)
(Barry, J.. dissenting on other grounds).
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determined minimum percentage of the population will make the
mental association between the mark and the origins. Courts should
be free to determine what factors can be used to determine if the
requisite similarity exists. This can include visual, audible, and
thematic similarities.
The renown of the senior mark is important because Congress
intended only to protect a small number of truly famous marks.",,

Congress was clear in forming a strict requirement of extensive fame
of a mark by including a list of eight factors to determine fame in the
FTDA15 9 By requiring a substantial degree of fame, this obligation
ensures that the FTDA "does not swallow infringement law by

allowing mark owners to end-run a likelihood of confusion analysis.. ."160 By requiring a high level of fame before a mark can obtain
dilution protection, the law will encourage trademark owners to

develop their marks extensively through advertising and product
development, and by ensuring consistent quality of their products.
Courts can evaluate the fame factor on a case-by-case basis and
develop the critical levels of fame and similarity through common
law.

Lastly, because plaintiffs will usually be seeking equitable relief,
traditional prerequisites of injunctive relief should apply. In order to
obtain an injunction, a party must show a lack of remedy at law,
presence of immediate irreparable harm, and a likelihood of success
on the merits.161 Given the harsh reality that actual economic harm
158. S. REP. No. 100-515 ("[The Act] creates a highly selective federal cause of action to
protect federally registered marks that are truly famous from dilution of the distinctive quality
of the mark. The provision is specifically intended to address a narrow category of famous
registered marks[] ... the Act is to be applied selectively and is intended to provide protection
only to those marks which are both truly distinctive and famous, and therefore, most likely to be
adversely affected by dilution. To protect these special marks, and to ensure that the bill does
not supplant the current protection of trademarks based on the likelihood of confusion, the
committee amended the legislation to place greater emphasis on the factors the courts must
weigh in determining whether a mark possesses a sufficient level of fame and distinctive quality
to qualify for federal protection from dilution.").
159. See 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H) (1999). The factors include: 1) the degree of inherent
or acquired distinctiveness; 2) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the
goods or services with which the mark is used; 3) the duration and extent of advertising; 4) the
geographical area in which the mark is used; 5) the channels of trade in which the mark is used;
6) the degree of recognition of the mark within the channels of trade used by the mark owner
and the defendant; 7) the extent of use of the mark by third parties; and 8) whether the mark is
registered.
160. Times Mirror Magazines, 212 F.3d at 171.
161. See Aiena v. Olsen, 37 F. Supp. 2d 303, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that the moving
party is required to demonstrate that it is threatened with irreparable injury, and either is likely
to prevail on the merits or has the balance of hardships tips in favor of injunction).
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caused by dilution cannot be determined; damages relief cannot be
awarded with any numerical certainty. Furthermore, in almost every
instance, damages cannot be awarded at all, and the only available
relief is equitable. A plaintiff also suffers immediate irreparable
harm the moment the public begins to associate a mark with the
defendant as well as the plaintiff. Therefore, the cornerstone of
trademark law -confusion-will be protected by traditional principles of equity. A plaintiff is required to show that a remedy at law
will not suffice and that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm to its
truly famous mark because there is a substantial amount of similarity
between the marks that will cause a significant portion of the public
to make the requisite mental association between the marks.
CONCLUSION

Since the passage of the FTDA in 1995, the federal courts have
struggled with the degree of proof necessary under the FTDA. The
fear of creating property rights in gross for trademarks has caused the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits to require the impossible proof of actual
consummated economic harm. However, this interpretation violates
the plain meaning of the statute, creates an uncompensable injury and
requires incalculable evidence. A fair reading of the FTDA, which
permits relief based on a showing of a likelihood of harm, will provide
protection against the loss of distinctiveness for the small number of
truly famous marks that qualify. By requiring a high degree of fame
and similarity, the FTDA will not create market impediments or
unnecessarily expand existing trademark law.

